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Abstract 
The paper verifies the Azzimonti et al. (2014) conclusions on a sample of 53 African 
countries for the period 1996-2008. Authors of the underlying study have established 
theoretical underpinnings for a negative nexus between rising public debt and inequality in 
OECD nations. We assess the effects of four debt dynamics on inequality adjusted human 
development. Instrumental variable and interactive regressions were employed as empirical 
strategies. Two main findings were established which depend on whether debt is endogenous 
to or interactive with globalisation. First, when external debt is endogenous to globalisation, 
the effect on inclusive human development is negative, whereas when it is interactive with 
globalisation, the effect is positive. This may reflect the false economics of pre-conditions. 
The magnitudes of negative estimates from endogenous related effects were higher than the 
positive marginal interactive effects.  Policy implications were discussed.  
JEL Classification: E60; F40; F59; D60; O55 
Keywords: Debts; globalisation; inequality; inclusive development; Africa 
 
1. Introduction 
The phenomenon of globalisation remains one of the most dominant politico-economic forces 
in the universe. It promises to alleviate social stringencies, strengthen institutions and improve 
global wellbeing through the victory of self-interest over altruism and markets over 
governments (Asongu, 2013a). According to narratives, the phenomenon broadly represents a 
global commitment/consensus from the culmination of cultural prosperity and historical 
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processes which can only be avoided by jeopardizing the progress of nations. Conversely, a 
stream of thought argues that the phenomenon is threatening to disfigure the human face and 
her planet in the manner it is evolving, inter alia: ecological decay, marginalization of poorer 
countries and widening gaps in income inequality to socially, economically and morally 
unacceptable standards.  
 
While the debate on the outcome of trade globalisation is gradually reaching some consensus, 
that on financial liberalisation is increasingly taking centre stage, especially with the 
recurrences of financial crises.  Accordingly, the potential benefits from international risk 
sharing and allocation efficiency in countries with scarce capital have been substantially 
outweighed by the downsides of the global financial meltdown (Kose et al., 2006, 2011; 
Henry, 2007), especially in more integrated economic/monetary zones (Price & Elu, 2014). 
According to this narrative, global financial instability is the result of increasing financial 
openness (Bhagwati, 1998; Rodrik, 1998; Stiglitz, 2000). This anti-thesis raises doubts on the 
financial openness rewards in terms of: stability in developed nations and economic growth in 
less developed countries (Fischer, 1988; Summers, 2000). Some accounts even suggest that 
financial globalisation may entail hidden ambitions of extending the rewards of international 
trade to benefits in assets (Asongu, 2014a).  
 
Two important trends have marked globalisation over the past 30 years:  burgeoning financial 
liberalisation and growing inequality (Azzimonti et al., 2014). Evidence of these tendencies 
are valid both for developing and developed nations. In the latter countries, while Atkinson et 
al. (2011) and Piketty (2014) have presented evidence of inequality, tendencies of evolving 
capital mobility have been documented by Obstfeld & Taylor (2005) and Abiad et al. (2008). 
With regard to the former or developing countries, whereas financial openness has been 
promoted by structural adjustment policies (Batuo & Asongu, 2015; Batuo et al., 2010), with 
the exceptions of Latin American and South East Asian countries, which have witnessed 
lower inequality associated with lower economic prosperity, inequality has been rising for the 
most part
1
. Therefore, Piketty’s recently celebrated literature in developed nations is broadly 
                                                             
1
 It is relevant to note that, the comparative periodicity affects the outcome. Accordingly, the 1980-2010 and 
1990-2010 periods may reveal different findings on the reduction of poverty in Africa (Young, 2012). Moreover, 
according to Fosu (2014), tendencies also differ between 1995-2010 and 1980-2010. Hence, this could 
substantially affect the narrative of ‘Africa being on time for the Millennium Development Goals’ (Pinkivskiy & 
Sala-i-Martin, 2014).  
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consistent with accounts from broad samples of developing nations (Fosu, 2010a; Mlachila et 
al., 2014; Mthuli et al., 2014) and African countries (Fosu, 2010b, 2010c, 2009, 2008; Elu, 
2013; Asongu, 2013b).   
 
In the light of the above, there are growing discussions in policy making circles on the need 
for inclusive development in the post-2015 sustainable development goals (SDGs) agenda 
(UN, 2013a, pp. 7-13)
2
. One of the most discussed findings in 2014 is Piketty’s celebrated 
‘capital in the 21st century’ which has established a u-shaped nexus between industrialisation 
and inequality. In other words, developing countries should not be prepared for 
industrialisation in light of Kuznets’ conjectures (1955, 1971) because ‘output may be 
growing and yet the mass of the people may be becoming poorer’ (Lewis, 1955). Given that 
one of the most important instruments of industrialisation in the 21
st
 century is globalisation, a 
recent interesting finding in this direction has concluded that globalisation-driven debts have 
increased inequality in the Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) countries (Azzimonti et al., 2014).  
 
The Azzimonti et al. (2014) conclusions are worth investigating in developing countries in 
general and African countries in particular for at least two main reasons. First, relative to 
other developing regions, Africa is less industrialised with more than a third having a 
manufacturing value added per capita of less than 100 US$  (UN, 2013b). Second, there are 
suggestions that the continent’s remarkable growth over the past decade may be marred by 
rising inequality (Blas, 2014). As noted by the World Bank (2013), almost one out of every 
two Africans lives in extreme poverty and it is expected that this rate will fall to between 16 
percent and 30 percent by 2030: albeit, most of the world’s poor will live in Africa by 2030. 
 
For brevity and space constraint, we refer the interested reader to the underlying study 
motivating this paper for the theoretical underpinnings surrounding the nexuses among 
globalisation, debts and inequality. We assess the effects of a plethora of debt dynamics on 
inequality adjusted human development. Instrumental variable and interactive regressions 
were employed as empirical strategies. Two main findings are established which depend on 
                                                             
2 The interested reader can find recent literature on the post-2015 objectives of sustainable development which 
we have do not discuss because of space constraint (Miller, 2014; Singh, 2014; Bagnara, 2012; Monika & 
Bobbin, 2012; Ozgur et al., 2009; Timmons et al., 2009).  
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whether debt is endogenous to or interactive with globalisation. Under the assumption that 
debt is endogenous to (interactive with) globalisation, the impact on inclusive human 
development is negative (positive). 
 
 The rest of the study is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses the data and 
methodology. The empirical analysis and discussion of results are covered in Section 3 while 
Section 4 concludes.  
 
2. Data and Methodology 
2.1 Data 
 We assess a panel of 53 African countries with data from World Bank Development 
Indicators for the period 1996-2008. The end date is limited to 2008 for a twofold interest: (1) 
the objective of capturing the pre-crisis period and; (2) Washington consensus policies that 
have driven globalisation-driven debts were no longer (in principle) dominant in African 
development policy models after 2008 (Fofack, 2014, pp. 5-6). 
The dependent variable is the inequality adjusted human development index (IHDI). Though 
it was first published in 2010, data on it is available from 1970 (Asongu, 2014b, p. 464).  
Financial liberalisation and trade openness variables are respectively: foreign direct 
investment (FDI) and trade openness. While the theory proposed by the underlying study 
(Azzimonti et al., 2014) is limited to financial liberalisation, we use trade openness and 
globalisation (FDI and trade) to improve subtlety of the analysis. Four main debt indicators 
were used: debt outstanding & disbursed (DOD), debt on concessional terms (DC), debt on 
non-concessional terms (DNC) and debt forgiveness or reduction (DFR).  It should be noted 
that DOD= DNC+DC. The control variables are:  Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth, 
financial depth, tertiary school enrolment, mobile phones subscriptions and government 
effectiveness.  Due to space constraint we justify and discuss the expected signs of control 
variables concurrently with the findings in Section 3. Definitions of these variables and 
corresponding summary statistics are presented in Panel A of Appendix 1.  
2.2 Methodology 
While the model proposed in the underlying study supposes that debt is endogenous to 
financial liberalisation, in this paper we assumed debt-driven globalisation as both 
endogenous and interactive. Instrumental variable regressions are employed in the former, 
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whereas interactive regressions are applied in the latter. The objective of this distinction is to 
limit the weight an assumption of unidirectional causality  may have on the estimated 
coefficients  
The first-stage of the instrumental variable (IV) regression consists of instrumenting the debt 
variables with globalisation dynamics, conditional on other covariates (or control variables). 
The fitted values or ‘globalisation-driven debt’ loadings are then saved and employed in the 
second-stage regressions as the independent variables of interest. The second-stage 
estimations are either based on Fixed- or Random-effects regressions depending on the 
outcome of the Hausman test for endogeneity. The summary statistics corresponding to the 
loadings from the first-stage regressions are presented in Panel B of Appendix 1.  
Under a scenario where-by debt-driven by globalisation is the origin of interactions between 
debt dynamics and globalisation, interactive variable modeling is employed based on Fixed- 
or Random-effects regressions, conditional on the outcome of the Hausman test for 
endogeneity. Accordingly, when the Hausman test is significant, a Fixed-effects model is 
recommendable. In the interactive models, all constitutive terms enter into the specifications 
because concerns of multicollinearity and overparameterization are not relevant in the 
specifications of such models (See Brambor et al., 2006, Section 3). This is essentially 
because, unlike linear additive models, estimated coefficients corresponding to the interactive 
variables are not treated as elasticities but considered as marginal effects of the modifying or 
globalisation variable.  
 Eq. (1) below is broadly consistent with the second-stage of the IV estimation and the 
interactive regression, but for the fact that loadings are employed in the former (to account for 
debts endogenous to globalisation) and interactions employed in the latter (to account for a 
modifying globalisation variable).  
tititih
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(1) 
Where: tiIHDI ,  
 is the Inequality adjusted Human Development Index for country i
 
at  period 
t ; is a constant,
 
W  is the vector of determinants,
 i
 is the country-specific effect, t is the 
time-specific effect and ti ,  the error term. All the regressions are based on Heteroscedasticity 
and Autocorrelation Consistent (HAC) standard errors. The Fixed-effects regressions are 
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specified to control for time-effects in an effort to further control for time invariant omitted 
variables and unobserved heterogeneity.   
 
3. Empirical Analysis 
3.1 Presentation of results  
3.1.1 Instrumental variable estimations   
Table 1 presents the findings of first-stage regressions from which the globalisation-driven 
debt loadings are obtained. In Panel A, the debt dynamics are regressed on globalisation 
variables conditional on other covariates. The regressions are classified into financial 
globalisation, trade globalisation and globalisation (which integrates the first-two). The 
correlation matrix on which the first-stage regressions are based is provided in Appendix 2. 
Financial liberalisation substantially drives ‘Debt Outstanding & Distributed’ due to its effect 
on ‘Debt on Non-concessional terms’, while trade openness has insignificant positive effects 
on both. The two globalisation dynamics mitigate ‘Debt on Concessional terms’, with the 
effect of trade openness significant at the 10% level. Neither forms of globalisation have a 
significant effect on ‘Debt Forgiveness or Reduction’. The positive (negative) effect of 
financial (trade) liberalisation on ‘Debt on Non-concessional terms’ (‘Debt on Concessional 
terms’) might be explained by the fact that globalisation reduces short term debts and favours 
long term debt (Schmukler & Vesperoni, 2006). Accordingly, long- (short-) term finance is 
preferred for investment (trade) purposes.  In essence, there are two principal motivations for 
lending by international financial institutions: investment and trade finance. The latter 
embodies projects of shorter duration and hence, an expected positive nexus between short-
run debt and trade activities.  
In Panel B, the validity of the loadings or instruments is tested by regressing the debt 
dynamics on the loadings. The results broadly confirm the validity of the instruments at the 
1% significance levels, though explanatory powers of the instruments vary across 
specifications; stronger for ‘Debt Outstanding & Distributed’  and ‘Debt on Concessional 
terms’ relative to ‘Debt on Non-concessional terms’ and ‘Debt Forgiveness or Reduction’ .  
We also notice that the explanatory powers are highest in increasing order, for: ‘Debt 
Forgiveness or Reduction’, ‘Debt on Non-concessional terms’, ‘Debt Outstanding & 
Distributed’  and ‘Debt on Concessional terms’. It is logical to expect that globalisation 
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instruments explain ‘Debt on Concessional terms’ highest because these concessional debts 
are loans with some grant element in the threshold of 25% or more. Since ‘Debt Outstanding 
& Distributed’ is the sum ‘Debt on Concessional terms’ and ‘Debt on Non-concessional 
terms’, its high value is driven by ‘Debt on Concessional terms’. It is also logical to expect 
‘Debt on Non-concessional terms’ and ‘Debt Forgiveness or Reduction’ to take the third and 
fourth positions. Accordingly, as we have already emphasised, while ‘Debt on Concessional 
terms’ is preferred to ‘Debt on Non-concessional terms’ at the advent of globalisation, ‘Debt 
Forgiveness or Reduction’ occur as a random effect of the phenomenon.  
The control variables are significant with the expected signs. First, economic prosperity in 
terms of GDP growth consistently mitigates dependence on debts and forgiveness of debts. 
This is essentially because of the increasing ability of the recipient country to 
service/reimburse its debts and sustain its ‘reimbursement credibility’ respectively. Second, 
while foreign aid is positively associated with debt dependence (Ouattara, 2006; Kanbur, 
1998), it is also logically negatively linked with reduction/forgiveness of debts.  
The correlation matrix corresponding to the loadings is presented in Table 2. It enables us to 
mitigate issues of overparameterization and multicollinearity in the second-stage regressions 
presented in Table 3. A Hausman test is performed prior to any specification. A rejection of 
the null hypothesis favors Fixed-effects (FE) regressions as opposed to Random-effects (RE) 
estimations. From the outcome, the null hypotheses of various specifications are 
overwhelming rejected. Hence, all specifications in Table 3 are based on FE regressions, with 
additional control for time-effects. Based on the results, the Azzimonti et al. (2014) 
conclusions on a negative nexus between globalization-driven debt and inequality are 
confirmed with respect to inequality adjusted human development. On a specific note, this is 
valid for: FDI driven ‘Debt Outstanding & Distributed’, FDI driven ‘Debt on Concessional 
terms’(DC), Trade driven DC, globalization driven ‘Debt Outstanding & Distributed’ and 
globalization driven DC.  
The findings are consistent with our previous elucidations on the quality of debt 
dynamics, with respect to the quality or explanatory power of corresponding instruments. 
First, we have established that ‘Debt Outstanding & Distributed’ is substantially explained by 
‘Debt on Concessional terms’. Consequently, all significant estimates are either ‘Debt 
Outstanding & Distributed’ or ‘Debt on Concessional terms’ oriented. Second, the first 
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affirmation is substantiated by the globalization-driven DC having a higher magnitude relative 
to globalization-driven ‘Debt Outstanding & Distributed’ (see DODFDI versus (vs) DCFDI 
and DODGlo vs DCGlo). This implies the lower magnitude of ‘Debt Outstanding & 
Distributed’ is due to the attenuation of the ‘Debt on Concessional terms’ effect by the 
insignificant ‘Debt on Non-concessional terms’ impact.  
 With the exception of mobile phone penetration, the three other control variables have 
the expected signs. While the effect of tertiary school enrolment is insignificant, those of 
financial depth and government effectiveness are positively significant.  Accordingly, 
financial depth has been established to be pro-poor in Africa (Asongu, 2013b; Batuo et al., 
2010; Kai & Hamori, 2009). Government effectiveness is intuitively expected to improve 
inclusive development because it is defined/measured as the formulation and implementation 
of policies that deliver public commodities to citizens. The unexpected effect of mobile 
phones has at least a twofold explanation. On the one hand, it starkly contrasts the pro-poor 
conclusions of Asongu (2015) because the author has used cross-sectional data for the period 
2009 whereas data in this study is for the period 1996-2008. On the other hand, Aker & Mbiti 
(2010) have concluded that the phenomenon of mobile phones is not a ‘silver bullet’ for the 
development of Africa.  
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Table 1: Deriving globalisation-fuelled debt factor loadings  
             
 Panel A: Instrumentation (Dependent variables: Debt dynamics. Independent variables: Globalisation dynamics) 
 Financial globalisation fuelled debts Trade globalisation fuelled debts Globalisation fuelled debts 
 Debt 
Outstanding 
& Disbursed 
(DOD) 
Debt on 
Concessional 
Terms  (DC) 
Debt on Non-
concessional 
Terms (DNC) 
Debt 
Forgiveness 
or Reduction 
(DFR) 
Debt 
Outstanding 
& Disbursed 
(DOD) 
Debt on 
Concessional 
Terms  (DC) 
Debt on Non-
concessional 
Terms (DNC) 
Debt 
Forgiveness 
or Reduction 
(DFR) 
Debt 
Outstanding 
& Disbursed 
(DOD) 
Debt on 
Concessional 
Terms  (DC) 
Debt on Non-
concessional 
Terms (DNC) 
Debt 
Forgiveness 
or Reduction 
(DFR) 
Constant 54.540*** 40.501*** 14.039 0.0007 39.898*** 42.283*** -2.385 -0.011** 49.157*** 49.535*** -0.378 -0.002 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.134) (0.800) (0.000) (0.000) (0.877) (0.038) (0.000) (0.000) (0.976) (0.689) 
FDI 1.706** -0.899 2.605** 0.0003 --- --- --- --- 1.491* -0.404 1.895* 0.0001 
 (0.021) (0.149) (0.023) (0.154)     (0.088) (0.439) (0.068) (0.533) 
Trade --- --- --- --- 0.077 -0.157 0.235** 0.00007 0.065 -0.133* 0.199 0.00004 
     (0.583) (0.109) (0.047) (0.212) (0.682) (0.087) (0.114) (0.466) 
NODA 3.544*** 2.110*** 1.434 -0.001*** 3.871*** 2.190*** 1.680* -0.001*** 3.637*** 1.989*** 1.648* -0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.106) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.089) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.053) (0.000) 
GDPg -3.608*** -2.476*** -1.131 -0.001*** 0.952 -0.538 1.490 -0.0005 -3.478*** -2.418*** -1.059 -0.001*** 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.127) (0.003) (0.675) (0.534) (0.310) (0.202) (0.000) (0.001) (0.128) (0.007) 
             
Adjusted R² 0.327 0.370 0.178 0.077 0.214 0.347 0.097 0.046 0.328 0.375 0.198 0.080 
Fisher  79.074*** 95.586*** 35.904*** 14.995*** 55.002*** 106.13*** 22.461*** 11.141*** 58.093*** 71.071*** 29.930*** 11.646*** 
Observations 483 483 483 501 594 594 594 623 467 467 467 485 
Countries 42 42 42 45 47 47 47 50 42 42 42 45 
             
 Panel B: Testing the strength of factor loadings (Dependent variable: Debt dynamics. Independent variables: instruments or globalisation-fuelled debts loadings) 
 Financial globalisation fuelled debts Trade globalisation fuelled debts Globalisation fuelled debts 
 Debt 
Outstanding 
& Disbursed 
(DOD) 
Debt on 
Concessional 
Terms  (DC) 
Debt on Non-
concessional 
Terms (DNC) 
Debt 
Forgiveness 
or Reduction 
(DFR) 
Debt 
Outstanding 
& Disbursed 
(DOD) 
Debt on 
Concessional 
Terms  (DC) 
Debt on Non-
concessional 
Terms (DNC) 
Debt 
Forgiveness 
or Reduction 
(DFR) 
Debt 
Outstanding 
& Disbursed 
(DOD) 
Debt on 
Concessional 
Terms  (DC) 
Debt on Non-
concessional 
Terms (DNC) 
Debt 
Forgiveness 
or Reduction 
(DFR) 
Constant 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) 
Loading 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Adjusted R² 0.329 0.373 0.181 0.081 0.217 0.349 0.100 0.049 0.333 0.379 0.204 0.086 
Fisher 238.214*** 287.95*** 108.16*** 45.167*** 165.56*** 319.48*** 67.611*** 33.533*** 233.880*** 286.131*** 120.49*** 46.876*** 
Observations  483 483 483 501 594 594 594 623 467 467 467 485 
Countries 42 42 42 45 47 47 47 50 42 42 42 45 
             
FDI: Foreign Direct Investment. NODA : Net Official Development Assistance. GDPg : GDP growth rate. *,**,*** : significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.   
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Table 2: Correlation matrix for second stage regressions  
                  
Financial globalisation fuelled debts Trade globalisation fuelled debts Globalisation fuelled debts Control variables   
DODFDI DCFDI DNCFDI DFRFDI DODTrade DCTrade DNCTrade DFRTrade DODGlo DCGlo DNCGlo DFRGlo Fin. D Gov.E Mobile TSE IHDI  
1.000 0.911 0.909 -0.733 0.902 0.893 0.779 -0.838 0.998 0.894 0.888 -0.735 -0.200 -0.324 -0.185 -0.442 -0.069 DODFDI 
 1.000 0.656 -0.710 0.850 0.918 0.642 -0.832 0.907 0.982 0.649 -0.714 -0.240 -0.336 -0.269 -0.418 -0.056 DCFDI 
  1.000 -0.625 0.793 0.708 0.776 -0.695 0.911 0.647 0.966 -0.624 -0.097 -0.265 -0.066 -0.341 -0.072 DNCFDI 
   1.000 -0.948 -0.884 -0.882 0.963 -0.733 -0.699 -0.612 0.996 0.244 0.297 0.224 0.407 0.091 DFRFDI 
    1.000 0.927 0.908 -0.973 0.909 0.831 0.792 -0.946 -0.271 -0.258 -0.216 -0.483 -0.082 DODTrade 
     1.000 0.685 -0.940 0.884 0.944 0.645 -0.906 -0.329 -0.315 -0.308 -0.474 -0.051 DCTrade 
      1.000 -0.841 0.802 0.572 0.848 -0.853 -0.138 -0.154 -0.074 -0.370 -0.103 DNCTrade 
       1.000 -0.835 -0.852 -0.647 0.976 0.315 0.262 0.285 0.462 0.062 DFRTrade 
        1.000 0.882 0.900 -0.738 -0.199 -0.301 -0.173 -0.452 -0.073 DODGlo 
         1.000 0.591 -0.725 -0.300 -0.331 -0.315 -0.427 -0.031 DCGlo 
          1.000 -0.596 -0.011 -0.223 -0.005 -0.319 -0.098 DNCGlo 
           1.000 0.276 0.297 0.246 0.415 0.079 DFRGlo 
            1.000 0.569 0.492 0.583 0.080 Fin. D 
             1.000 0.371 0.357 0.187 Gov. E 
              1.000 0.422 0.004 Mobile 
               1.000 -0.062 TSE 
                1.000 IHDI 
                  
DOD: Outstanding & Disbursed Debt. DC: Concessional Debt. DNC: Non Concessional Debt. DFR: Debt Reduction or Forgiveness. DODFDI: FDI  Driven DOD. DODTrade: Trade Driven DOD. DODGlo:  
Globalisation Driven DOD.  DCFDI: FDI  Driven DC. DCTrade: Trade Driven DC. DCGlo:  Globalisation Driven DC. DNC FDI: FDI  Driven DNC. DNCTrade: Trade Driven DNC. DNCGlo: Globalisation Driven 
DNC. DFRFDI: FDI  Driven DFR. DFRTrade: Trade Driven DFR. DFRGlo: Globalisation Driven DFR. Fin. D: Financial Depth. Gov. E: Government Effectiveness. Mobile: Mobile phone penetration. TSE: Tertiary 
School Enrolment. IHDI: Inequality Adjusted Human Development Index.  
 
Table 3: Second-Stage regressions (Based on panel fixed- or random-effects) 
             
 Dependent variable: Inequality Adjusted Human Development Index 
 Financial globalisation fuelled debts Trade globalisation fuelled debts Globalisation fuelled debts 
 Outstanding 
& Disbursed 
Debt  
(DOD) 
Concessional 
Debt (DC) 
Non-
concessional 
Debt (DNC) 
Forgiveness 
or Reduction 
of Debt 
(DFR) 
Outstanding 
& Disbursed 
Debt  
(DOD) 
Concessional 
Debt (DC) 
Non-
concessional 
Debt (DNC) 
Forgiveness 
or Reduction 
of Debt 
(DFR) 
Outstanding 
& Disbursed 
Debt  
(DOD) 
Concessional 
Debt (DC) 
Non-
concessional 
Debt (DNC) 
Forgiveness 
or Reduction 
of Debt 
(DFR) 
Constant 1.027*** 1.029*** 1.021*** 1.021*** 0.955*** 0.964*** 0.948*** 0.954*** 1.065*** 1.068*** 1.060*** 1.058*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
DODFDI -0.0001** --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.015)            
DCFDI --- -0.0002*** --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
  (0.000)           
DNCFDI --- --- -0.0004 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
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   (0.788)          
DFRFDI --- --- --- 0.044 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
    (0.735)         
DODTrade --- --- --- --- -0.000 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
     (0.519)        
DCTrade --- --- --- --- --- -0.0002*** --- --- --- --- --- --- 
      (0.005)       
DNCTrade --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.00009 --- --- --- --- --- 
       (0.496)      
DFRTrade --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.093 --- --- --- --- 
        (0.627)     
DODGlo --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- -0.0001** --- --- --- 
         (0.013)    
DCGlo --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- -0.0003*** --- --- 
          (0.000)   
DNCGlo --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- -0.0001 --- 
           (0.492)  
DFRGlo --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.014 
            (0.922) 
Financial  Depth  0.060 0.068* 0.045 0.044 0.020 0.030 0.016 0.019 0.073* 0.079* 0.061 0.057 
 (0.109) (0.065) (0.229) (0.246) (0.545) (0.356) (0.622) (0.563) (0.083) (0.051) (0.136) (0.168) 
Gov. Effectiveness 0.011 0.012 0.008 0.007 0.011 0.015* 0.009 0.011 0.012 0.013 0.009 0.008 
 (0.248) (0.210) (0.455) (0.461) (0.219) (0.076) (0.331) (0.225) (0.214) (0.154) (0.363) (0.427) 
Mobile Phone -0.0005* -0.0005** -0.0004 -0.0004* -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0004 -0.0004 
 (0.053) (0.028) (0.104) (0.094) (0.211) (0.163) (0.282) (0.218) (0.152) (0.108) (0.204) (0.219) 
Tertiary School 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.131) (0.094) (0.185) (0.176) (0.231) (0.197) (0.258) (0.232) (0.179) (0.134) (0.226) (0.230) 
Time effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Hausman  test  32.372*** 32.291*** 32.309*** 33.395*** 37.192*** 36.327*** 37.498*** 37.355*** 32.911*** 31.779*** 32.866*** 33.235*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.004) (0.000) (0.002) 
             
Within  R² 0.757 0.770 0.744 0.744 0.726 0.736 0.727 0.726 0.727 0.740 0.714 0.712 
Fisher  928272*** 981740*** 881969*** 881984*** 729718*** 756044*** 731662*** 728721*** 905354*** 952858*** 863798*** 857508*** 
Observations 156 156 156 156 179 179 179 179 148 148 148 148 
Countries 28 28 28 28 32 32 32 32 28 28 28 28 
             
. *,**,*** : significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.  DOD: Outstanding & Disbursed Debt. DC: Concessional Debt. DNC: Non Concessional Debt. DFR: Debt Reduction or Forgiveness. DODFDI: 
FDI  Driven DOD. DODTrade: Trade Driven DOD. DODGlo:  Globalisation Driven DOD.  DCFDI: FDI  Driven DC. DCTrade: Trade Driven DC. DCGlo:  Globalisation Driven DC. DNC FDI: FDI  Driven DNC. 
DNCTrade: Trade Driven DNC. DNCGlo: Globalisation Driven DNC. DFRFDI: FDI  Driven DFR. DFRTrade: Trade Driven DFR. DFRGlo: Globalisation Driven DFR. Gov. Effectiveness: Government Effectiveness.  
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Table 4: Interactive regressions (Based on panel fixed- or random-effects) 
             
 Dependent variable: Inequality Adjusted Human Development Index 
 Financial globalisation fuelled debts Trade globalisation fuelled debts Globalisation fuelled debts 
 Outstanding 
& Disbursed 
Debt  
(DOD) 
Concessional 
Debt (DC) 
Non-
concessional 
Debt (DNC) 
Forgiveness 
or Reduction 
of Debt 
(DFR) 
Outstanding 
& Disbursed 
Debt  
(DOD) 
Concessional 
Debt (DC) 
Non-
concessional 
Debt (DNC) 
Forgiveness 
or Reduction 
of Debt 
(DFR) 
Outstanding 
& Disbursed 
Debt  
(DOD) 
Concessional 
Debt (DC) 
Non-
concessional 
Debt (DNC) 
Forgiveness 
or Reduction 
of Debt 
(DFR) 
Constant 1.035*** 1.031*** 1.025*** 1.008*** 0.965*** 0.955*** 0.958*** 0.938*** 0.946*** 0.938*** 0.936*** 0.919*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
DOD -0.0002*** --- --- --- -0.0002** --- --- --- -0.0003*** --- --- --- 
 (0.000)    (0.011)    (0.000)    
DC --- -0.0003*** --- --- --- -0.0003** --- --- --- -0.0004*** --- --- 
  (0.000)    (0.026)    (0.002)   
DNC --- --- -0.0002* --- --- --- -0.0004* --- --- --- -0.0005**  
   (0.084)    (0.075)    (0.016)  
DFR --- --- --- -0.012 --- --- --- -0.094** --- --- --- -0.031* 
    (0.409)    (0.013)    (0.053) 
FDI 0.0002 0.0004 0.0007 0.001** --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.810) (0.587) (0.337) (0.026)         
Trade  --- --- --- --- 0.00002 0.0001 0.00001 0.0002 --- --- --- --- 
     (0.911) (0.517) (0.946) (0.079)     
Globalisation (Glob) --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 0.00003 
         (0.170) (0.409) (0.284) (0.651) 
DOD*FDI 0.00002** --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.017)            
DC*FDI --- 0.00003* --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
  (0.066)           
DNC*FDI --- --- 0.00004* --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
   (0.084)          
DFR*FDI --- --- --- -0.001 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
    (0.710)         
DOD*Trade --- --- --- --- 0.000001 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
     (0.287)        
DC*Trade --- --- --- --- --- 0.000001 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
      (0.539)       
DNC*Trade --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.000006 --- --- --- --- --- 
       (0.138)      
DFR*Trade --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.001** --- --- --- --- 
        (0.010)     
DOD*Glo --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.000002** --- --- --- 
         (0.019)    
DC*Glo --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.000002 --- --- 
          (0.122)   
DNC*Glo --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.000007** --- 
           (0.014)  
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DFR*Glo --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.0005** 
            (0.014) 
Financial  Depth  0.055 0.055 0.052 0.053 0.030 0.036 0.019 0.015 0.026 0.031 0.014 0.009 
 (0.123) (0.125) (0.173) (0.173) (0.347) (0.223) (0.557) (0.642) (0.420) (0.338) (0.668) (0.772) 
Gov. Effectiveness 0.008 0.006 0.008 0.004 0.011* 0.009 0.014* 0.011 0.010 0.008 0.012 0.010 
 (0.237) (0.374) (0.365) (0.656) (0.068) (0.105) (0.079) (0.146) (0.125) (0.212) (0.112) (0.205) 
Mobile Phone -0.0004* -0.0003 -0.0006** -0.0005* -0.0001 -0.00005 -0.0003 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0003* -0.0003 
 (0.016) (0.187) (0.020) (0.052) (0.403) (0.799) (0.150) (0.285) (0.245) (0.499) (0.098) (0.136) 
Tertiary School 0.001* 0.001 0.002* 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.057) (0.147) (0.057) (0.106) (0.119) (0.245) (0.135) (0.223) (0.121) (0.234) (0.138) (0.210) 
Time effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Hausman  test  34.389*** 31.616** 32.751*** 32.099*** 35.633*** 33.290*** 38.464*** 35.425*** 34.814*** 33.567*** 37.674*** 36.439*** 
 (0.000) (0.011) (0.007) (0.009) (0.003) (0.006) (0.001) (0.003) (0.004) (0.006) (0.001) (0.002) 
             
Within  R² 0.810 0.805 0.786 0.768 0.760 0.757 0.747 0.737 0.781 0.774 0.773 0.752 
Fisher  1116453*** 1088147*** 991406*** 898305*** 784409*** 777465*** 746026*** 705853*** 795990*** 772368*** 766520*** 692350*** 
Observations 156 156 156 158 179 179 179 181 187 187 187 189 
Countries 28 28 28 29 32 32 32 33 32 32 32 33 
             
. *,**,*** : significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.  DOD: Outstanding & Disbursed Debt. DC: Concessional Debt. DNC: Non Concessional Debt. DFR: Debt Reduction or Forgiveness. 
DOD*FDI: FDI  and  DOD. DOD*Trade: Trade and  DOD. DOD*Glo:  Globalisation and DOD.  DC*FDI: FDI  and DC. DC*Trade: Trade and  DC. DC*Glo:  Globalisation and DC. DNC* FDI: FDI  and DNC. 
DNC*Trade: Trade and DNC. DNC*Glo: Globalisation and DNC. DFR*FDI: FDI  and DFR. DFR*Trade: Trade and DFR. DFR*Glo: Globalisation and DFR. Gov. Effectiveness: Government Effectiveness. 
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3.1.2 Interactive estimations 
  Table 4 above reveals interactive estimations based on Panel Fixed -and Random-
effects regressions. Like in the second-stage of the IV procedure in the preceding section, the 
choice of either model is decided by the outcome of the Hausman test. The specifications are 
Fixed-effects because the Hausman test is overwhelmingly rejected. The following findings 
are established: first, the effects of debt dynamics on inclusive development are consistently 
negative across specifications. This confirms narratives challenging the legitimacy of some 
external debt in Africa, inter alia:  past external debts have failed to benefit the poor/people; 
the borrowing was for the most part done without the consent of the people and ‘creditor 
awareness test’ can be established by historical evidence (Boyce & Ndikumana, 2011).  
Second, a possible reason for the positive association between financial globalisation 
and debts is that the former could provide incentives for long-term unsustainable debts.  
Third, the interactive marginal effects are overwhelmingly positive in financial liberalisation 
and globalisation interactions for the most part. The absence of significant marginal 
interactive effects with trade openness implies that the positive effects between globalisation 
and the debt dynamics are substantially driven financial globalisation. We do not lay much 
emphasis on the magnitude of interactive estimates because of high decimal values. What is 
interesting to note however is that the results contrast with those in Table 3. Hence, it may be 
established that the effect of globalisation driven-debts on inclusive human development may 
be positive or negative depending on whether debts are modelled as endogenous to 
globalisation or interactive with globalisation.  
The discussions related to the significance and signs of the control variables are 
consistent with the elucidations relevant for Table 3 above.  
 
4. Concluding implications 
 
With growing evidence that public support for globalisation is waning in both 
developed and developing nations, studies have emerged with a frantic search for avenues out 
of a regime characterised by a morally enervating unvarnished capitalism. The paper has 
contributed to this narrative by investigating the Azzimonti et al. (2014) conclusions and 
responding to the increasing demand for globalisation to be given a human face in the light of 
the post-2015 development agenda.  
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We have investigated the impact of debts on inclusive human development using two 
assumptions of globalisation-driven debt. Under the assumption that debt is endogenous to 
(interactive with) globalisation, the impact on human development is negative (positive). The 
following policy implications are worthwhile 
First, whereas the findings may reflect the false economics of pre-conditions in which 
access to external debt is conditioned on the adoption of more friendly policies towards 
financial liberalisation and trade openness, we wish to stay away from the debate because it is 
out of scope. Accordingly, while resisting the itch, we welcome the debate as an interesting 
future research direction. Moreover, the interested reader may refer to Monga (2014) for more 
insights. 
Second, we have found that the magnitudes of estimates confirming the conclusions of 
the underlying paper are higher relative to those rejecting them. Hence, globalisation could be 
a substantial instrument in improvement human development if it is tailored with equitable 
and sustainable human development policies.  
Third, the influence of debt on concessional (non-concessional) terms is more (less) 
significant in the scenario where the conclusions of the underlying paper are confirmed. This 
implies loans incorporating a grant element have a better chance of affecting inclusive 
development.   
 As a broad policy implication, the findings could be viewed in light of  Piketty’s 
celebrated capital in the 21
st
 century in the perspective that, globalisation should not lead 
African countries to industrialisation according to Kuznets’ conjectures. Hence, in order to 
achieve the post-2015 inclusive development objectives, external debt acquisition policies by 
sampled countries (conditional on globalisation) should be tailored towards their effects on 
human development. This would require, inter alia: improving the credibility and legitimacy 
of some external debts in the continent. Measures tailored along this line of policy should 
involve, amongst others, ensuring that: external debt benefits the people, domestic 
governments’ borrowings are mandated by the people and creditors restraint from some 
capitalistic ideals by imposing some inclusive human development lending conditions.  
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Appendix 
 
Table 1: Variable definitions and summary statistics  
      
Panel A: Variable definitions and summary statistics for Development, Debt and Control variables 
      
 Mean S.D Min. Max. Obs 
Inequality Adjusted Human Development Index (IHDI) 1.482 6.792 0.127 47.48 479 
Debt Outstanding & Disbursed (DOD) in % of GDP 96.587 118.97 3.202 1520.6 632 
Debt on Concessional Terms (DC) in % of GDP 55.786 54.936 0.000 376.89 632 
Debt on Non-concessional Terms (DNC) in % of GDP 40.801 87.598 0.283 1143.7 632 
Debt Forgiveness or Reduction (DFR) in % of GDP -0.024 0.092 -1.353 0.000 671 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in % of GDP 4.118 8.532 -8.629 145.20 510 
Net Official Development Assistance (NODA) in % of GDP 10.868 12.943 -0.251 148.30 653 
Gross Domestic Product Growth rate (GDPg) in annual % 4.917 7.724 -31.300 106.28 659 
Financial Depth (Money Supply) in % of GDP 0.311 0.228 0.001 1.279 530 
Tertiary School Enrolment (TSE) % of Gross 6.217 8.733 0.219 54.355 357 
Mobile Cellular Subscriptions (Mobile) per 100 people 10.817 18.805 0.000 119.99 684 
Government Effectiveness (Gov. E) -0.675 0.616 -1.853 0.807 496 
      
Panel B: Variable definitions and summary statistics of loadings or Globalisation-driven debt dynamics  
      
 Mean S.D Min. Max. Obs 
      
FDI  Driven DOD (DODFDI) 81.163 46.588 -23.529 634.52 483 
Trade Driven DOD (DODTrade) 91.636 48.605 41.898 636.59 594 
Globalisation Driven DOD (DODGlo) 80.550 46.951 -16.608 647.17 467 
FDI  Driven DC (DCFDI) 47.337 25.728 -6.107 293.79 483 
Trade Driven DC (DCTrade) 51.355 27.984 3.590 331.33 594 
Globalisation Driven DC (DCGlo) 46.171 25.286 -13.483 281.25 467 
FDI  Driven DNC (DNCFDI) 33.826 25.462 -20.302 340.74 483 
Trade Driven DNC (DNCTrade) 40.280 24.942 -5.642 305.26 594 
Globalisation Driven DNC (DNCGlo) 34.379 27.340 -4.475 365.92 467 
FDI  Driven DFR (DFRFDI) -0.022 0.020 -0.232 0.014 501 
Trade Driven DFR (DFRTrade) -0.022 0.017 -0.202 0.005 623 
Globalisation Driven DFR (DFRGlo) -0.021 0.021 -0.234 0.015 485 
      
S.D: Standard Deviation. Min: Minimum. Max: Maximum. Obs: Observations 
 
Appendix 2: Correlation matrix for first-stage regressions  
         
Debts Globalisation Control variables  
DOD DC DNC DFR FDI Trade NODA GDPg  
1.000 0.726 0.902 0.012 0.232 -0.005 0.545 0.109 DOD 
 1.000 0.359 -0.007 -0.003 -0.176 0.609 -0.020 DC 
  1.000 0.022 0.319 0.100 0.360 0.156 DNC 
   1.000 -0.030 0.044 -0.186 -0.058 DFR 
    1.000 0.445 0.156 0219 FDI 
     1.000 -0.095 0.151 Trade 
      1.000 0.044 NODA 
       1.000 GDPg 
         
DOD: Outstanding & Disbursed Debt. DC: Concessional Debt. DNC: Non Concessional Debt. DFR: Debt Reduction or 
Forgiveness. NODA: FDI: Foreign Direct Investment. Net Official Development Assistance. GDPg: GDP growth rate.  
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